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Abstract
When and how should a fundraiser ask for a donation from an individual facing an uncertain bonus income?
A standard model of expected utility over outcomes predicts that the individual’s before choice – her ex-ante
commitment conditional on her income – will be the same as her choice after the income has been revealed.
Deciding “if you win, how much will you donate?” involves a commitment (i) over a donation for a state of the
world that may not be realized and (ii) over uncertain income. Models involving reference-dependent utility,
tangibility, and self-signaling predict more giving before, while theories of affect predict more giving after. In
our online field experiment at a UK university, as well as in our laboratory experiments in Germany, charitable
giving was significantly larger in the Before treatment than in the After treatment for male subjects, with a
significant gender differential. Lab treatments isolated distinct mechanisms: for men, donations were higher in all
treatments where the donation’s collection was uncertain, whether or not the income was known. This supports a
(self)-signaling explanation: commitments realized with a lower probability must involve larger amounts to have
the same signaling power. Our results are directly relevant to fundraising and volunteer-recruitment strategies,
and offer further evidence that we need to exercise caution in applying expected-utility theory in the presence of
social preferences.
Keywords: Charitable giving, social preferences, gender, public goods, experiments, field experiments, signaling,
prospect theory, contingent decision-making, bonuses, uncertainty, affective state.
JEL codes: D64, C91, L30, D01, D84.
1 Introduction
What is the best way to to ask for a charitable donation from an individual who may get an uncertain bonus income?
Should you ask her before – to commit to donate if she wins the bonus – or ask her after – to donate after her bonus
has been revealed? If she is an expected utility maximizer with an unchanging utility function who only cares about
outcomes, this should not matter.
However, there are important differences between these two modes of asking which may be have an impact on
behavior. (i) Before commitments are from uncertain income, (ii) before commitments to donate are not realized
with certainty, and (iii) after commitments follow an experience of winning a random draw. Thus, a variety of
alternative models predict a difference in behavior depending on when a person is asked to commit. We report on
a series of field and laboratory experiments involving uncertain prizes and appeals for charitable giving, offering
the first salient economic evidence on this question, and differentiating among alternative models. In each of our
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experiments male (but not female) subjects committed significantly more when asked before than when asked after,
and the gender interaction is also significant. The laboratory evidence suggests the male response was driven by the
uncertain collection of the donation rather than the uncertainty of the income.
This is an important issue for policymakers and fundraisers. Many workers receive windfall payments, such as
bonuses, in supplement to their regular income. In the 2011/12 tax year, bonuses to UK workers totaled £37 billion,
of which £13 billion was in the financial sector, at an average rate of £12,000 per worker (ONS, 2012). Over a
similar period, individual charitable giving was £9.3 billion. In the United States, Wall Street banks distributed
$26.7 billion in bonuses in 2013 (Office of the NY State Comptroller, 2014). Anecdotal evidence (from our own
personal correspondence) suggests that a significant share of this bonus income was not fully anticipated.1 In the
wake of recent recession and scandals in the financial markets, bankers have been encouraged to give back their
bonuses, or donate them to charity.2 Our experimental evidence suggests that it may be more effective to ask
bankers to commit to donate from future bonuses if they exceed some particular expected value.
This question is also relevant to a variety of other situations in which individuals may be asked, or volunteer,
to commit or donate from actual or potential financial gains. Lottery and raﬄe organizers may ask for pledges
from participants, in the event that they win. Philanthropists such as Warren Buffet and Marc Benioff might ask
up-and-coming entrepreneurs to commit to donate a share of their future payoffs if their start-ups make it big;
philanthropic venture capitalists may make this a condition of funding. “Ethical” investment accounts could be
set up to automatically donate dividends and capital gains that exceed expectations.3 In several prominent cases
university students have been asked to publicly pledge a share of their future income.4
This also has an important implication for experimental methodology. If individuals’ conditional donation choices
for a state of the world respond to the probability that this state will be realized, this violates simple expected
utility maximization over outcomes. This casts doubt on the standard experimental claim that when only one
stage is chosen randomly for payment, subjects treat each stage independently (see Reinstein, 2010 and Tonin and
Vlassopoulos, 2011 on this point).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no direct economic evidence on the effect of the resolution of uncertainty
or ambiguity on other-regarding behavior. Kuhn et al. (2011) conducted a survey in conjunction with the Dutch
Postcode Lottery. They found that while lottery winners were more likely to donate their survey fee to charity,
greater lottery winnings did not further increase this probability. However, these winnings were already realized
when the question was asked. Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2011) and Reinstein (2010) have run experiments involving
charitable donation in uncertain environments, where only one of a series of decisions will be implemented; both find
that donations decline over time. According to Reinstein “if individuals are not [expected utility] maximizers over
outcomes but gain warm glow utility from unrealized commitments this decline could be attributed to satiation
of warm glow”. In laboratory dictator games Brock et al. (2013) and Kircher et al. (2009) both find that social
preferences and fairness concerns appear to depend on a combination of ex post and ex ante concerns. Smith (2011)
found that giving (to other subjects who had incurred an income loss) was higher when the giving decisions were
made using the strategy method rather than when subjects were asked ex-post. However, Buchner et al. (2007),
1 “Most people at the top or the bottom of the performance level will know they’re (not) getting a bonus - people in the middle will be
unsure until they’re announced. Among the people who know they’re going to get a bonus, the size of the bonus is uncertain until
announced.” – Raj C: Hedge Fund Manager, London (2015). See also forum posts <http://www.quora.com/Bonuses/How-accurately-
can-an-employee-predict-his-or-her-annual-bonus-in-advance-e-g-in-the-banking-industry>, accessed 7 Feb, 2015.
2 “Johnson: Bankers should assuage guilt by giving bonuses to homeless scheme.” – The Guardian, 13 Feb 2009.
3 Triodos Bank, for example, offers a “Save and Donate” account <http://www.triodos.co.uk/en/personal/savings-overview/charity-
saver/>, promoted as an ethical way to save. However, these accounts currently involve fixed interest rates and a fixed share that is
donated.
4 The Gates-Buffet ‘Giving Pledge’ asks billionaires to commit to give away at least half their wealth to charity in their lifetime or in their
will (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Giving_Pledge). Marc Benioff’s SF Gives recently asked 20 tech companies to give at least
$500,000 a piece to fight poverty <http://valleywag.gawker.com/the-marc-benioff-public-shaming-school-of-philanthropy-1564843302>.
“Giving What We Can,” founded by Tony Ord, has asked students to make a giving pledge to donate roughly 10% of their future
income. According to their website <http://www.givingwhatwecan.org/about-us> they have 269 members and over $100 million has
been pledged. The Chronicle of Higher Education (13 Feb., 2011) reported on a similar pledge by students at Rutgers University.
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find no strong differences in a related context. These results tend to argue against relying on a model where an
individual maximizes expected utility with a consistent utility function that considers only outcomes.
The question of generosity over uncertain income is distinct but related to generosity over future income. Breman
(2011) ran a field experiment asking donors to pre-commit to increase their regular donation either immediately,
in one months time, or in two months time. Commitments could be reversed but they rarely were. She found the
longest delay led to the greatest increase in contributions. Her explanation is that the cost of giving occurs at the
time of payment, while “the warm-glow . . . will be experienced at the time of committing to giving.”5 These results
largely support Andreoni and Payne (2003), who write that “a commitment to a charity may yield a warm-glow to
the givers before they actually mail the check. Hence, the benefits can flow before the costs are paid”.6
Much previous work has found gender differences in the levels and determinants of other-regarding behavior.
In laboratory dictator experiments involving “donations” to other subjects Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found
that men give more than women when the price is low, while women give more than men when the price is high
(the price is defined as the amount a subject sacrifices of her own payoff per unit given to another subject). If we
consider our uncertain collection treatments as involving as a lower price for sending a positive signal, this would
predict that men respond more than women to these treatments (as we observe). However, the results of Cox and
Deck (2006) suggest that women are more sensitive to the cost-benefit ratio in such settings: they are more generous
than men particularly when social distance is low or when the cost of generosity is low. Furthermore, in a charitable
giving field experiment, Meier (2007) finds women respond (insignificantly) more to the price of giving.
Relative to women, men’s donations appear to be more driven by prestige and signaling concern, at least insofar
as they are signaling “above average donations”. Evidence for this comes largely from experiments involving actual
charitable giving. Jones and Linardi (2014) found that (in lab and field experiments) women tended to “conform
to the modal contribution when . . . names and contributions are revealed” while men reacted to visibility “by
increasingly choosing a contribution equal to the maximum of his group members’ contributions”. They hypothesize
that “unlike males, females are ‘wallflowers’ who suffer disutility from both negative and positive reputation.” In
another experiment involving real charitable giving, Jingping (2013) found that “men’s giving was sensitive to
category setting and public reporting, while women’s [was] not”, arguing that “compared to women, men value a
generous image and conform more to the profile of ‘image-seeker’ in pro-social behaviors.” This is consistent with
Pan and Houser (2011), who found that males but not females responded positively to a competition to be the best
contributor in a public goods game, and with Rigdon et al. (2009) who find that men but not women, transferred
more in response to a minimal social cue (three “watching eyes” dots). At the extensive margin, Meier (2007) also
found in a field experiment that males were more sensitive to social information.7 Böhm and Regner (2013) and Van
Vugt and Iredale (2013) offer further evidence that public goods provision responds more strongly to being observed
for men than for women, the latter find this holds mainly when the observer is a women deemed attractive. These
authors explicitly invoke an account from evolutionary biology, arguing that for men, providing public goods signals
their generosity, making them more attractive to women.
We present the results of multiple experiments that offer the first systematic insight into giving under uncertainty.
5 Breman draws on Thaler and Benartzi (2004), whose “Save More Tomorrow” experiment found that individuals save more when asked
to pre-commit a portion of future pay raises towards retirement savings. She extends the “pre-commitment for the future” part of
their treatment to the charitable domain; our experiments extend the commit uncertain salary increases effect (which the authors
argue is driven by loss aversion).
6 This motivates the question “when does the benefit of giving occur and how long does it last?” By the logic of these papers we might
expect to see charitable giving exclusively through end-of-life bequests (at least in countries where bequest giving is not penalized).
These commitments would yield warm glow that could be savored over one’s entire life, leaving the remaining wealth for personal
consumption of durable goods that could be enjoyed sooner, and for longer. However, only 7% of people leave money to charity in
their will. Bequest giving raises £2 billion a year, which is approximately 20% of UK giving by individuals (Cabinet Office, 2011,
Giving White Paper, HM Stationary Office.)
7 Students at Zurich were asked to donate a specific amount to one or both of two social funds, and were presented with one of two
pieces of information about the rate of contribution. Male than (but not female) students at Zurich were significantly more likely to
donate to at least one fund when they were told that a higher percentage of students had recently donated, and gender differences
were significant.
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Our first piece of evidence comes from a field experiment in a university setting. Participants completed a survey or
online task in return for a 25% chance of winning a prize worth £20 (a restaurant or an Amazon.co.uk voucher).
When they entered the website they were assigned either to the Before treatment, which asked “Before we reveal if
you have won . . . how much you would like to donate, if you win the prize . . .?” or to the After treatment, which
asked winners “(Now that you have won) . . . how much you would like to donate . . .?”. Committed amounts were
automatically deducted from the prize. While we found no significant differences in amounts committed overall, in
light of previous work, we differentiated our results by gender. For male (but not female) subjects we found greater
giving in the Before (relative to the After) treatment. The gender difference in response to this treatment was
statistically significant.
Our laboratory evidence, discussed below, serves to confirm and replicate this result, as well as to provide more
nuanced findings.8 Our field evidence can be seen as reduced form. It suggests that a before ask might be successful
in some field settings if pledges were made binding, but it does not isolate the mechanism(s) responsible for this.
Several behavioral economic models could broadly explain the differences. As noted above, these Before and After
treatments differ in at least three respects. There are both theoretical and practical implications of identifying the
effects of each element; policymakers and fundraisers need to know which elements are (more) important in tailoring
their policies. For example, if it is merely the uncertainty of the commitment that increases (expected) contributions
it might be effective to ask for conditional commitments, e.g., “in the event of a large Ebola outbreak in West Africa
in 2016”, or to ask for commitments to donate bone marrow “in the unlikely event that you are a match.”
To get at this, our lab experiments varied the presentation of the earnings as random or fixed, the timing of
the contribution request, the presentation of these requests, and the probability that the donation was collected.
Depending on the treatment, we observed conditional pre-commitments for (losing and) winning states, decisions
after winning (or losing) a lottery, or decisions over certain income. We found small treatment effects on average, and
insignificant overall differences in the amounts committed. However, as in our field experiment, we found significant
treatment effects for males and significant gender differences. Furthermore, males committed more in treatments
where the donation was uncertain, whether or not the income was uncertain. This suggests a (self-)signaling
motivation may be driving the male response.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we formalize the experimental environment and the notation. We
introduce basic models of expected utility over outcomes, signaling, loss aversion, and affective state. We discuss
the predictions of these models for the “before versus after” comparisons and for the variations of these used in
our laboratory experiment, allowing us to empirically differentiate between models. In Section 3.1 we present the
details of our field experiment, while Section 3.2 explains the key elements and implementation of our laboratory
experiment. In section 4 we first present our main results across both experiments, and then present more detailed
results for our laboratory experiment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Setup and Predictions
In this section we offer a theoretical perspective on giving when income and/or a donation’s collection is uncertain.
We present several simple models, explaining how these yield distinct predictions, and thus how our experimental
findings can be differentiated from alternative hypotheses.
8 We also ran an earlier “Commitment” field experiment in a similar context. In the earlier experiment, we found greater commitments
were made in the Before treatment, with similar results for both genders. However, these commitments often went unfulfilled and may
have been based on a very different calculus. The actual donations were not significantly different across treatments (given the sample
size there was little statistical power to detect a difference here). This suggests that the automatic deduction may have been critical,




We first depict several variants of “normal giving,” “conditionally asking before,” and “asking after,” essentially
describing each of the treatments used in our laboratory and field experiment.9 We use these to explain and
distinguish the predictions of several models of “giving in uncertain environments”; these differential predictions are
summarized in Table 1 at the end of this section.
Consider two income levels, w and `, where w > ` > 0. For our Benchmark setting, a person with a certain
income of w or ` may donate gw or g`, respectively.1. On the other hand, she may know she is facing a lottery with a
non-degenerate probability p of winning a prize w > 0 and a probability 1− p of losing and getting a prize ` ≥ 0.
Consider the following settings.
• After setting (A): She learns whether she has won or lost the lottery. If she has won, she is then asked to
donate to a specific charity. She donates gAw ≥ 0. If she loses, she is also asked to give, and she donates gA` ≥ 0.
• Before setting (B): She is asked to make a binding commitment to donate to a specific charity if she wins w.
She commits to give gbw ≥ 0 if she wins.10
Our main question is: how does her commitment, in the Before setting, to donate “if she wins”, compare to her
donation in the After setting when she has already won, i.e., gbw S gaw.
All of the donations above are considered to be collected for sure; i.e., after any uncertain earnings have been
resolved, the donation chosen for that state is passed to a charity. However, ex-ante, the individual in the Before
setting who commits to donate “if she wins” will only have to pass this on with probability p. To isolate the
“uncertain donation” aspect of the Before setting we consider:
• Uncertain setting (U): The individual’s income is certain (at w or `) but she commits to donate knowing
the donation guw or gu` (from income w or `, respectively) will only be collected with probability P = p, and
otherwise she will keep this money.
Expected utility maximization over outcomes
In the most widely cited models of charitable giving, only an individual’s realized contribution (and consumption)
affects her utility. She may care about the total amount of the public good provided (Becker, 1974), she may gain
“warm glow” from the amount of her own income she has actually given away (one interpretation of Andreoni, 1990),
or she may care about her impact on outcomes (Duncan, 2004) or on an individual she identifies with (Atkinson,
2009). Here, intentions and commitments to contribute that are unrealized do not affect utility. While other models
emphasize the reputation and signaling benefits of giving (Harbaugh, 1998), self-signaling (Benabou and Tirole,
2005), moral concerns of reciprocity (Sugden, 1984), or a Kantian motive (Sugden, 1982; Roemer, 2010), these have
been modeled solely in terms of actual donations.11 Because of this, the timing and uncertainty of the decision (i.e.,
whether it is a sure thing or a prospect) is irrelevant to the individual’s choice. This will hold for any model that
can be expressed in terms of expected utilities over outcomes; this is stated in prediction 1, which we trivially show
in the appendix.
9 See Table 2 for a concrete depiction of the lab procedure. Although the prize in the first field experiment is a dinner, a restricted
form of consumption, and not a cash prize, this is inconsequential to our argument. See Pollak (1969) for a discussion of conditional
demand; a “gift in kind” that cannot be traded can be considered in that context.
10 In the first wave of laboratory experiments we also included a “Before Both” treatment (BB). This was as in Before, but the subject
was also asked to commit to give gbb` ≥ 0 if she loses. As our self-signaling model does not make a clear prediction for this treatment,
we dropped it in our second wave to more efficiently test this model, and for brevity. Our results are not substantially affected by the
inclusion or exclusion of this treatment (available by request). In general, male (but not female) subjects committed more from the
winning income in the BB treatment, relative to the baseline. For both genders the commitment from the winning income in the BB
treatment is similar to the commitment in the Before and Uncertain treatments.
11 To be precise, the reciprocity and Kantian models mentioned are procedural and not based on utility-maximization; still, these do not
have an explicit role for unrealized commitments. We also note that more recent work has argued, in an experimental context, that
intentions and commitments may yield direct utility and signaling value; we return to this later.
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Prediction 1. Expected utility maximizers
gw = gaw = gbw = guw and
g` = ga` = gb` = gu`
2.2 (Self-)signaling
The idea that people are able to positively signal to themselves or others by committing to give with positive
probability, even if the gift is not realized, is supported by Kircher et al. (2009). In their experiment, subjects were
presented with three options: to get more money; to get less money and more of some other good; and to flip a coin
between these two alternatives. When the “other” good was a consumption good, randomization was negligible.
When it was a social good that yielded payoffs to another subject, nearly a third of their subjects randomized.
While they highlight fairness as the key issue, other interpretations are possible. Suppose that the commitment to
donate with some probability itself yields a benefit (e.g., self-signaling, impact, or warm glow), but there are locally
diminishing returns to both private consumption and donation. Here, the choice of a coin flip over the social good
can be seen as convexifying over private consumption and other-regarding choices to find an optimum.
Donating with certainty or with some probability may allow the individual to differentiate herself from “worse
types”, and this may benefit her reputation or self-esteem (Benabou and Tirole, 2003), yielding a utility gain. On
the other hand, she is sacrificing some expected income, hence sacrificing utility from consumption. Both the
signaling benefit and the utility benefit of additional income may not only be a function of the expected values,
but may depend on the probability distribution. As noted above, Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2011) allow benefits
via self-signaling to accumulate even for unrealized uncertain donations. However, they do not consider that the
signaling value itself may be lower when the probability of realizing the commitment decreases.
Below, we offer a simple signaling model with two types of agents or two types of self: one who gets an inherent
benefit from donating to the charity (a “good type”), and one who does not (a “bad type”). We focus on parameter
values where, at the good types’ preferred donation (ignoring signaling), the bad types have an incentive to pool to
gain reputation. Here, as the probability of collection decreases, the level of conditional-on-collection donations that
can be sustained as an equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion increases. Essentially, as the intent to donate
can still be demonstrated, while the cost of actually donating will only be paid with a probability less than one, the
(minimum) conditional-on-collection donation must increase in order to separate types.
We demonstrate, using a simple signaling model, that the uncertain collection of donations can lead to higher
(conditional) donations. We then argue that this extends to the setting where income is uncertain and individuals
commit aan amount to donate, if anything, in the event of their receiving a bonus. In our example and our lab
experiment, the probability that a subject’s committed donation is realized is the same value (p < 1) for Before and
Uncertain treatments; for the Benchmark and After treatments this probability is 1.
Signaling Model of Reputation with uncertain collection
We define an individual’s Bernoulli utility as an additively separable function:
v(x, g) = u(x) + θω(Dg) +R(φ),
where x is an individual’s own consumption, g is the amount committed to donate, andD is an indicator variable taking
the value one if the committed donation is collected, and zero otherwise. θω(·) is his intrinsic utility from donating,
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and θ ∈ {0, 1} reflects his type, “good” or “bad,” respectively, drawn by nature with pr(θ = 1) := µ∈ (0, 1).12 u(·)
represents the sub-utility of own-consumption. The function ω(x) represents his private benefit from actually giving x
(akin to a warm-glow function). R(φ) is his utility from his reputation, a function of φ, which represents the posterior
probability he and others put on him being of type θ = 1, where R(0) = 0, R(µ) = λr, R(1) = r; r> 0, 0≤ λ ≤1.
Note φ may depend on g−i and g in equilibrium, where g−i is the vector of others’ committed contributions.
As in Benabou and Tirole (2005), we consider a direct payoff from reputation. However, as these authors note,
whether in a social- or self-signaling context, “the value of reputation may . . . be instrumental . . . or purely hedonic”.
By standard assumptions, she will maximize the expected value of this Bernoulli utility function subject to the
budget constraint
x+ g ≤ E,
where E denotes wealth. We consider only one income level initially and hence omit any superscripts indicating
income. The expected value of the utility can be restated as
Uθ(E, g) = u(E) + p[u(E − g)− u(E)] + pθω(g) +R(φ),
where p = pr(D = 1), i.e., the probability (at the time the donation decision is made) that the donation will be
collected. We consider equilibria where someone is assumed to be a potential good type only if he donates g1. Note
that in a separating equilibrium reputation benefits are 0 for the bad types and r for good types. As we are only
allowing positive donations (g ≥ 0 is an implied constraint), it is trivial to show that in a separating equilibrium
bad types donate nothing, i.e., g0 = 0, which we assume henceforth. In a pooling equilibrium, everyone will get
reputation benefit R(µ) = λr.
Separating equilibrium: constraints
We next state the constraints for a separating equilibrium. The relevant constraint of the good type is that
U1(g1) > U1(g) ∀g. (1)
The relevant incentive compatibility condition of the bad type requires
U0(0) > U0(g1). (2)
Let g∗ represent a good type’s preferred donation net of reputation, i.e.13
g∗ = argmaxg {u(E − g) + ω(g)}.
Solutions
Case 1 Suppose at g∗ the bad type will not deviate even if that brings him reputation benefit r, i.e., suppose
−p[u(E − g∗)− u(E)] ≥ r. (3)
Then, in the separating equilibrium with the lowest level of contributions (which is also the one that maximizes
welfare for the good type, and the only one satisfying the intuitive criterion), g1 = g∗, independent of p. The
bad type’s incentive constraint does not bind in this case, while the good type chooses her warm-glow maximizing
12 Our key insights will generalize to a model in which types have continuous support, and the probability distribution may condition on
a set of observable variables including gender and previous actions, as long as some uncertainty remains.
13 Note that, excluding reputation, the probability of collection does not matter for the optimal decision here.
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donation level, satisfying condition 1. Note that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium here. Summing up, for the
intuitive equilibrium in this parameter space, conditional donations do not change in the probability that they
are collected; hence by the intuitive criterion the expected donation will increase in p. Conversely, the expected
contribution will decrease as p decreases up until the point at which 3 no longer holds, i.e., up to the point where
the collection probability is low enough to tempt bad types to imitate the good types.
Case 2 Suppose condition 3 fails, i.e, −p[u(E − g∗)− u(E)] < r.
Thus if g1 ≤ g∗ the bad type would have an incentive to deviate and donate, i.e., the IC constraint is binding for
bad types. Thus g1 = g∗ cannot be part of equilibrium play. There are multiple separating equilibria. Consider the
separating equilibrium with the lowest level of contributions, which is the only equilibrium that will survive the
intuitive criterion. Here, a good type’s contribution gmin1 solves:
−p[u(E − gmin1 )− u(E)] = r. (4)
In this case, if the collection probability p decreases, the minimum level of conditional donations that separates
types (gmin1 ) increases. 14
Summarizing Cases 1 and 2 Thus, beginning at a value of p where (3) holds with inequality, reducing p a
small amount has no effect on conditional donations (g∗) but lowers expected donations (pg∗). Reducing it further
causes (3) to no longer hold, but permits only an intuitive separating equilibrium where h’s donate gmin1 > g∗.
Further reducing p increases gmin1 but lowers the probability the contribution is realized.15
We can now compare across settings. For illustration (and resembling our lab experiment) assume that the
probability of winning in the Before and After settings, and the probability the donation is collected in the Uncertain
setting are all p = 1/2. Suppose that the reputational benefit is such that case 2 applies for p = 1/2 while case 1
obtains if p = 1. This would imply that in the Uncertain collection setting good types will commit to donate gmin1 .
In the After setting (with the same income) corresponding to p = 1, good types will donate g∗ < gmin1 .
Alternately, suppose case 2 held for both p = 1 and p = 1/2. Here donations in the After setting would be above
g∗, but still below gmin1 , the Uncertain donation commitment.
We can extend this to situations where income is also uncertain (E =Eh with probability p, E = El otherwise),
and donations are collected only if income is high. The objective function will become:
Uθ(E, g) = pu(Eh) + (1− p)u(E`) + p[u(Eh − g)− u(Eh) + θω(g)] +R(φ).
This leaves the above analysis unchanged. Where the “winning and collection probability” p is low enough
relative to reputational benefits r, the intuitive equilibrium Before commitment of good types, gmin1 , increases above
g∗. However, for this same probability p, an ask after a win will only elicit a donation of g∗ < gmin1 , provided r is
not too high, or else a donation between gmin1 and g∗. Note also that as the ex-ante probability that the donation is
14 We may also have pooling equilibria where both types contribute gpool satisfying g∗ ≤ gpool < gmin1 . These are possible where bad
types are willing to contribute g∗ even to gain the lower reputation R˜(gpool|pooling). I.e.,
−p[u(E − g∗)− u(E)] < R˜(gpool|pooling) < r, (5)
where the latter inequality is given to highlight that a pooling equilibrium could be ruled out under a weaker condition than condition 3.
For lower values of p this equation holds for a wider range of preferences. However, the pooling equilibrium also does not survive the
intuitive criterion, as good types could deviate, e.g., to gmin1 + for  small.






≥ gmin1 (where the latter inequality follows) iff u is convex), implying
d(pgmin1 (p))
dp
≤ 0 if and only if u is convex. Thus,
under a standard assumption of diminishing returns to own-consumption (concave u), lowering p will reduce expected contributions.
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realized is the same in either setting (Before or After-Win) the expected value of the donation will be higher for the
Before ask.
Summarizing the above, where parameters are consistent with case 2 (under the Before or Uncertain environments)
this model yields Prediction 2.
Prediction 2. Signaling generosity, specified conditions
guw = gbw > gw = gaw
for good types, while bad types are unaffected by the treatment. A similar relationship will hold for donations
from the lower level of income `.
For our lab experiment, if parameter values for the male subgroup resemble case 2 (under p = 1/2) , this could
be an explanation why their Before donations (gmin1 ) – where the individual is asked to commit to donate if he
wins only – exceed their After donations (g∗), where the ask occurs only if he wins. This also describes our field
experiment (letting p = 1/4), and would describe a situation where fundraisers only felt it appropriate to ask for
donations from bonuses (or lottery wins, etc).
In both experiments we find that women give roughly the same amount whether or not the collection is certain.
This could be explained by a smaller reputation motive relative to women’s warm glow term, as discussed in the
introduction. Note that as R(·) declines the parameters move towards case 1 above, and if R(·) is not present the
results are as in the expected utility model.
2.3 Loss Aversion and Reference Points
When making – even riskless – choices, it is often argued that decisions are influenced by anticipated gains and
losses relative to a reference point (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). Thaler and Benartzi (2004) claim “. . . once
households get used to a particular level of disposable income, they tend to view reductions in that level as a
loss.” In considering this model, we suppose the individual has a reference point over her own consumption, not
including charitable giving, and her utility function sums a standard reference-independent term and a gain-loss
component. Her donation decision, whether stochastic or certain, anticipates how the donation will reduce the
remaining wealth available for her own consumption. If this will fall below her reference point, she will incur a
psychological loss. We assume there is no gain-loss utility over the donation itself (i.e., a single target, as in Camerer
et al., 1997).16 While the reference point may change over time, we assume here that she is myopic in the sense that
when making a (commitment) decision she does not anticipate these changes. For simplicity, we consider a utility
function embodying a linear loss function, i.e.,
v(x, g, r) =
u(x) + ω(Dg) if x ≥ ru(x)− λ[u(r)− u(x)] + ω(Dg) if x < r;
subject to the budget constraint x+ g ≤ E.
As before x represents own consumption, g is the committed donation expenditure and D indicates whether
it is realized, r is a reference point, specified below, and λ is a positive constant. Here u(·), the sub-utility of
own-consumption, is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, as is the “warm glow” function ω(·).
16 This may hold if donating nothing and using all income for own-consumption is typically seen as the status-quo, thus the basis for a
reference point. Also note that this model’s predictions would be qualitatively the same if there were two targets, but the gain-loss
utility were far more salient for consumption targets than for giving targets.
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Suppose the reference point always corresponds to the expected future income at the point of the decision,
the maximum own-consumption one could achieve if one’s “investments” paid their expected value. We consider
two different ways this reference point may update to the realization of uncertainty. First, we consider immediate
adjustment, second, we consider a very sticky adjustment process.17 To save space, all of these derivations are in the
online appendix.
Suppose the reference point always corresponds to the expected future income at the point of the decision, the
maximum own-consumption one could achieve if one’s investments paid their expected value. This implies:
Prediction 3. Loss Aversion, expected income, immediate adjustment
gbw > gw = gaw = guw (where gw < w − z) and
g` = ga` .
The analysis above generalizes to any intermediate reference point (derivation in appendix.)
If we assume that an individual’s reference point corresponds to the original expected-value income throughout
the relevant decision period, we have a slightly different prediction:
Prediction 4. Loss Aversion, expected income, no adjustment
gbw = gaw > gw = guw and
ga` < g`.
2.4 Affective state (unanticipated) and generosity
A favorable realization of a lottery may put people in a good mood; an unfavorable resolution may do the opposite.
Theories and evidence on the interaction of affective state and generosity point to more giving when an individual
is in a positive mood (Levin and Isen, 1975; Weyant, 1978; Underwood et al., 1976; Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011;
Kidd et al., 2013). On the other hand Fishbach and Labroo, 2007 offer mixed evidence, and Kuhn et al., 2011, find
“greater lottery winnings do not raise the likelihood that a household will donate its fee for completing our survey to
charity”.18
Putting this together we might predict greater generosity after a prize has been won, relative to before the prize
outcome is known, and relative to a certain income. We might also predict lower generosity after failing to win the
prize relative to after a certain income (although the “negative state relief” model of Cialdini et al., 1973, predicts
the reverse). If individuals in the Before setting do not anticipate their change in mood from winning or losing, if
neither non-random earnings nor facing a lottery directly affects mood, then (ignoring other effects) the conditional
commitments in the Before setting will equal the Benchmark donations for the corresponding income levels.19
17 We can consider the “ask,” even a fairly neutral ask, as a special shock motivating giving by changing the environment/context or
temporarily adjusting the utility function to make the utility slope of giving particularly steep (via alleviating guilt or providing special
warm glow); see Andreoni and Rao (2011) and models in Reinstein (2011) and Kotzebue and Wigger (2009). Hence we may predict
individuals will give a larger share of their “winnings” when asked in our experiments than the share of their income they might
normally donate. The reference consumption basket might be based on her expectations before being asked to donate, thus deducting
no donation; alternately, it may have anticipated a small probability of an ask, or it might immediately subtract the expected value of
the conditional donation after the ask. For any of these the reference consumption is still less than the higher earnings w..
18 In "Tournament Outcomes and Prosocial Behaviour" Kidd et al. (2013) participants take part in a real effort tournament followed by
the opportunity to contribute to a set of well-known charities. The authors find that those who are higher ranked contribute more
(after controlling for earnings) and argue that this is driven by the "positive affect experienced by the winners . . . determined by the
difference between their realized and expected ranks."
19 Similar predictions could arise out of an (indirect) reciprocity model (see Simpson and Willer, 2008), e.g., if the lottery’s sponsor
were the charity itself, or were believed to be sympathetic to the charity; the reciprocity motive would also have to depend on the
realization of the “gift” and not only its probabilistic implementation.
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Prediction 5. Affective state
gaw > gw = gbw, ga` < g`
2.5 Magical thinking
Participants may have non-standard beliefs about probabilities and randomness. In particular, they may believe that
their commitment to contribute will increase their likelihood of winning. This may stem from “magical thinking.”
This may also result if the participants do not trust the experimenters’ promises; we try to minimize this in the
laboratory experiment through a verifiable ex-ante randomization process. An individual who believes in Karma (cf.
Levy and Razin, 2006) may believe she will be rewarded for good acts (or good commitments) and punished for
bad ones.20 While we can not rule this out, we emphasize in each experiment that stochastic outcomes have been
determined by random draw prior to their donation choices. We also differentiate our results by measures of stated
religiosity, finding no significant differences (details by request).
2.6 Summary of theories and empirical implications
Benchmark After Before Uncertain
Earnings probabilities; at time of donation Certain (w, `) pr(w) = p; resolved pr(w) = p; unresolved Certain (w, `)
Probability commitment is collected Certain Certain P=p P=p





Note: 0 < P = p = pr(w) < 1. Earnings ` < w.
Predictions of models (vs. benchmark), assuming “low” giving
1. Expected utility max (over outcomes) (=,=) = =
2. Signaling generosity (Case 2) (=,=) + (+,+)
3. Loss averse, linear loss function,
Expected income (or intermediate) reference point
a. Immediate adjustment (=,=) + =
b. No (or slow) adjustment (+,=) + =
4. Affective state (unanticipated) (+,-) = =
Table 1: Potential comparisons, predictions
The Benchmark column indicates the standard allocation of certain wealth in the Benchmark environment (here, as
in column U, w and ` should not be thought of as a “win” or “loss” incomes, but just as two levels of income). In
the columns After, Before, and Uncertain, we depict the predicted differences from column the benchmark, for
these potential variations in the environment. Rows 1-4 represent the distinct models described above. None of the
rows in this table are identical across all columns; thus, they can be differentiated empirically. In particular, note
that the signaling model is the only one that predicts that the committed donation will respond to the certainty of
the donation’s collection.21
20 Participants may donate more before if they believe that a spiritual force affects their winning probabilities; but it is not clear whether
in the Before treatment she will give conditional or unconditionally. She may want to appease the gods by saying “I will donate
anyway,” or she may want to give them an incentive to make her a winner by making her donation conditional on a win. Similarly,
she may donate more After out of a sense of gratitude towards this spiritual force. (As this is difficult to pin down, we did not include
it in the table.)
21 However, the theory allows for potential overlap in contributions between the models, depending on the size of the effects, on how
reference points move, and on other parameters. We may also expect heterogeneous behavior and some or all of these effects may be
present for any individual, and the relative importance of these effects may vary by individual and with the environmental context.
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3 The Experiments
3.1 Field experiment: Design
Our field experiment was launched in the context of an employability promotion funded by the University of Essex
Faculty of Social Sciences; all promotional information was explicitly noted as coming from this faculty.22 Eligible
undergraduate students were sent a series of emails encouraging them to participate, with text such as the following:
Subject: Employability promotion—a 1 in 4 chance of winning a £20 prize for doing a short survey.
Text: Please go to [SITE]—we have 80 free dinners for two in Colchester to give away, worth £20 each and at
least 40 £20 Amazon vouchers!! If you log on, you will have a one in four overall chance of winning one of these
prizes!
The site was also promoted through extensive flyering, postering, university web sites, and online social media.
We obtained 352 responses that involved a valid donation choice. No students were allowed to participate more then
once.
Participants first signed in with their email, department, and study year. Half of the participants were then
asked to sign up for a job site (JobsOnline) and enter two jobs of interest to them.23 Next, they were informed of
the prize which they had a 25% chance of winning (the prizes were administered orthogonally to other treatments).
After this they were presented our donation treatments, seen in the screenshots in Figure 1, which closely resemble
the Before and After treatments described above. We gave away two prizes - the dinner and the Amazon voucher –
and asked for contribution commitments, which were to be directly deducted from these prizes.24
As the screenshots show, we made several choices aimed at increasing the baseline rate of contributions.
Participants were required to either enter a donation amount and a charity, or uncheck a box if they preferred
not to donate. We offered a 10% matching contribution for all donations, and donations were publicly made and
recorded on JustGiving, either anonymously or with a message, as the participant wished. All donation commitments
were automatic deducted from prizes won, and we informed participants of this, stating “. . .your donation will be
automatically deducted from your prize and passed on to the charity of your choice, plus an additional 10% from
our own funds. . .”
Extensive further details, including additional screen shots, a timeline, information on other treatment arms, and
implementation details, are given in an online appendix.
Thus, in between-subject experiments, we will not be able to exactly identify an individual’s motivation (but note that within-subject
experiments are vulnerable to reference point and apparent contrast effects). We see our results as plausible measures of the most
quantitatively important net effects. Note also that for 3b in the After column the latter equality depends on our assumption of
a linear loss function; relaxing this, the difference will depend on the curvature of the loss function. For loss aversion models the
Uncertain prediction relies on the assumption that the reference point does not depend on the anticipated contribution (see footnote
17); this is discussed further in the online appendix.
22 This faculty included Economics, Government, Sociology, Language and Linguistics departments, the Center for Psychoanalytic
Studies, and later the Essex Business School. The eligible students were in their first and second years through October 2013, and then
were in their second and third (final) years in following academic year. In the later run, we began with this same set of departments,
and ultimately expanded eligibility to all undergraduate students in all departments at the University of Essex, in order to be able to
use all of the prizes before our institutional deadline.
23 This was one of two additional treatments administered orthogonally to the donation treatments, each for half the subjects. i. This
“employability” treatment required half of participants to sign up for a jobs site and enter two jobs of interest. ii. A question and
answer treatment asked about rates of employment and salary. The latter “information” treatment occurred after the donation
treatment. We do not expect that the former treatment would have any effect on donation behavior, and our donation results do not
differ substantially by this treatment. More details on these treatments and on their assignment ordering are given in the online
appendix; linked at <http://goo.gl/g9lHVG>.
24 Randomization checks on the treatment balance (and summary statistics) are given in Table 3. As noted, the experiment was run over
two academic years, with a virtually identical web site and two separate but very similar promotions. In the later run we only offered




































3.2 Laboratory Experiment: Design and implementation
As discussed above, the laboratory environment permits more control and a wider variety of treatments; we use this
to differentiate between alternative theoretical models. Our laboratory design followed the description in Section 2.1;
with a Benchmark of certain income, and After, Before, and Uncertain donation treatments; this is depicted in
Table 2.25
Treatment
Benchmark After Before Uncertain
I Base Income for Task (€7 or €14)
II Real effort task
III Rem: Income (€7/ €14) ————— Info: possible bonus (€7/ €0) ————— Rem: (€7/ €14)
IV   Donation (if win) 
V  ———————— Bonus revealed ———————— 
VI Don (uncond) Don (uncond)  Don (if collect)
VII Belief average donation (incentivized)
VIII Reveal distribution of income; elicit conditional beliefs on donations (incentivized)
IX Hypothetical donation
X Survey
XI Reveal/confirm outcomes (collection, prediction payments), make payments
Table 2: Experimental Design
Note: Boxes () imply this screen was not present for the treatment in this column.
Subjects were seated at computer terminals and given a code number. They were told that they were to perform a
Raven’s matrix task lasting about half an hour (see Raven, 1936).26 Subjects were told they would be rewarded €7
for this (or €14 in more than half of the Benchmark and Uncertain treatments) independently of their
performance.27 After the task, in screen III, the Benchmark and Uncertain subjects were reminded of their earnings,
and the rest were told:28
With a probability of 50 percent you will be rewarded a bonus of €7 on top of your already acquired
income of €7. Whether you will be rewarded this bonus depends on the code that you have been given
at the beginning.
We used this tangible pre-assigned code, in conjunction with a sealed envelope pinned to the laboratory door, to
demonstrate to the subjects that neither their performance nor their donation choices could affect their chances of
winning (details are in the online appendix).29
The donation decisions followed the design described in Section 2.1. Those in the Before treatment were next
given a chance to conditionally donate, before learning if they won the bonus, with the text (translated from
German):
25 In our first wave we also included a “Before Both” treatment; results are not sensitive to this, as discussed in an earlier footnote.
These results are available by request..
26 This task is a language-free multiple choice intelligence test where subjects have to recognize patterns and choose the correct pattern
to complete a sequence of patterns. The version we use consists of five blocks with twelve sequences of patterns each.
27 For those whose income was deterministic (Benchmark and Uncertain) and never expressed as a probability, we assigned more than
half to the higher income. This allowed us greater power to distinguish between treatments from donation commitments from €14
28 All instructions are translated from the original German. The complete set of screenshots and translations are given in an online
appendix.
29 This may also reduce the influence of magical thinking on donation behavior; some subjects may believe that “karma” can influence
future but not predetermined events.
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In case of you winning the bonus of €7, we now want to give you the opportunity to donate a part of
the income you have earned in this experiment to a charitable organization. In doing so, you can choose
between "Brot fur die Welt" (Bread for the World) and the "World Wildlife Fund (WWF)". We will
increase your donation by an additional 25 percent taken out of our own budget. At the end of a session,
one person will be randomly chosen to monitor that the conductor of the experiment will transfer all
collected donations to the respective organizations. Please enter the amount of your donation in case of
you winning the bonus (amount can be between €0 and €14). In case of you not winning the bonus,
nothing will be deducted from your income and the organization will not receive a donation. Please
choose the charity you want to donate to (if you have entered 0 above, no selection is necessary).
Next (screen V), Before and After subjects were told whether they won the bonus. After subjects were then
asked if they would like to donate, with similar language as above, i.e.:
We now want to give you the opportunity to donate a part of the income you have earned in this
experiment to a charitable organization. ... Please enter the amount of your donation (amount can be
between 0 and [total earnings, €7 or €14]). ... Please choose the charity ... [ellipses indicate text in
common across treatments]
Benchmark subjects were also asked to donate from their (known) income, with virtually identical language as for
the After subjects.
The Uncertain subjects were instructed:
With a probability of 50% you will now have the opportunity to donate a part of the income you have
earned in this experiment to a charitable organization. Whether you will have the opportunity to donate
depends on the code that you have been given at the beginning—it is independent of your performance
regarding the tasks . . . Please enter the amount of your donation in case of you being able to donate
(amount can be between 0 and [total earnings, €7 or €14]). In case of you not being able to donate
nothing will be deducted from your income and the charity will receive no donation...
Following the donation decision, we asked the subjects to make a series of incentivized and hypothetical predictions,
followed by survey questions and comprehension checks.30Finally, we revealed net earnings including prediction
earnings, and revealed to those in the Uncertain treatment whether their donations would be collected. We opened the
sealed envelope to verify to subjects that the random draws (bonuses and collection) had indeed been pre-determined.
Payments were made and donations were then passed to the charities, with a subject monitoring this, as promised.
The laboratory experiments were run in Dusseldorf and Mannheim on a standard experimental subject pool,
using virtually identical protocols and Ztree code at each lab. We ran nine sessions over five days in January and




We first present evidence on whether our randomization successfully balanced the treatments. Table 3 reports the
results of comparisons between two treatment arms of the field experiment and among the four treatments in the
30 We first asked them to predict for what others donated; subjects were informed that they would be given €0.50 per answer that was
within €1 of the correct answer. First, they were asked guess the average overall donation. We next told them the two possible
earnings asked them to guess the average contribution from each level of earnings. Finally, we asked them a hypothetical question:
what would their own donations have been had they earned the other income/bonus amount? Details of this part of the design, the
incentives, and the results, are given in our online Appendix. These results are largely of independent interest, and not strongly
related to the main question of this paper.
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laboratory experiment. The mean values of observable variables are similar across treatments, and we do not detect
significant differences in either the field or the lab experiment. All donations are reported in Euros.31
Table 3: Summary statistics and randomization checks
Panel A: Field Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before After p-value Obs
Jobs Treatment 0.25 0.21 0.50 352
(0.03) (0.05)
Female 0.51 0.58 0.30 348
(0.03) (0.06)
E. Bus. School 0.24 0.28 0.50 352
(0.03) (0.05)
Observations 280 72
Panel B: Laboratory Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income Certain Before After Uncertain p-value Obs.
High Income 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.64 0.52 195
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Female 0.51 0.55 0.45 0.51 0.77 195
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age 24.41 23.69 24.18 25.15 0.54 195
(0.88) (0.45) (0.60) (1.02)
No religion 0.59 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.72 195
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Previous donor 0.41 0.38 0.29 0.32 0.57 195
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 41 58 49 47
Note: This table reports the results of comparisons of the treatments in the Lab and the Commitment experiment. For the field experiment
we test for differences between the treatments using a t-test. In the laboratory experiment we test for differences among all treatments with a
joint F-test. For the field experiment the number of observations for the Female variable is lower than for the other characteristics; due to a
technical error on our web site we could not verify the gender for four of the participants.
Next, we compared the donations for our treatments with probabilistic collection (pooling Before and Uncertain
for the lab experiment) to the donations for treatments with certain collection (pooling Benchmark and After for
the lab). This comparison is depicted in Figure 2, and summary statistics and tests are in Table 4.
31 Donations from the field experiment in the UK are evaluated at an exchange rate of 1.1971 EUR/GBP (October 1, 2013 rate).
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Figure 2: Mean donations by experiment and by certain versus probabilistic collection
Note: This graph reports the average donations for all treatments with certain collection versus all treatments with probabilistic collection.
For the Lab experiment, we pool treatments After and Income Certain to create into the group Certain, indicating treatments in
which subjects know their committed donation will be collected for sure. We pool the treatments Before and Uncertain into the group
Probabilistic.
Table 4: Mean donations by experiment and by certain versus probabilistic collection
Field Lab
Treatment Total Male Female Total Male Female
Certain Mean 1.63 0.56 2.39 2.07 1.76 2.43
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
75 pctl 1.20 0.00 2.39 4.00 2.00 4.00
s.d. (3.76) (1.56) (4.62) (2.07) (2.26) (1.80)
Pos. Donation 0.31 0.17 0.40 0.65 0.56 0.76
Probabilistic Mean 2.02 2.24 1.86 2.81 3.31 2.28
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 2.00
75 pctl 1.20 1.20 2.39 4.00 5.00 4.00
s.d. (4.71) (5.43) (3.99) (2.80) (3.26) (2.14)
Pos. Donation 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.73 0.71 0.74
Total Mean 1.94 1.93 1.98 2.55 2.76 2.33
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
75 pctl 1.20 1.20 2.39 4.00 4.00 4.00
s.d. (4.53) (5.00) (4.13) (2.59) (3.02) (2.02)
Pos. Donation 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.70 0.66 0.75
Difference -0.39 -1.68 0.53 -0.74 -1.55 0.15
p-value (t-test) 0.51 0.10 0.47 0.12 0.04 0.78
p-value (rank sum) 0.89 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.03 0.59
Observations 352 164 184 134 70 64
Note: This table reports the average donations for all treatments with certain collection versus all treatments with probabilistic
collection. For the Lab experiment, we pool treatments After and Income Certain to create the group Certain, indicating treatments in
which subjects know their committed donation will be collected for sure. We pool treatments Before, and Uncertain to set the group
Probabilistic, indicating that the collection of the committed amount is uncertain. The sum of observations in columns 2 and 3 is less
than column 1, as, due to a web site error, we could not verify the gender for four participants. We present the p-value of a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test at the bottom of the table.
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Next we consider this in a linear regression context. Table 5 reports the effect of a donation’s collection being
probabilistic (rather than certain) on the amount donated. Again, in columns 3 and 4, we pool treatments Before
and Uncertain to create the dummy Probabilistic, indicating that subjects knew that their committed donation
was collected with a probability below one. In columns (5) and (6) we exclude the Uncertain treatment from the
analysis so that Probabilistic reflects only the Before treatment. The qualitative results are the same in all columns:
males gave more in response to probabilistic treatments, females did not, gender interactions are significant, and the
average effect of treatments (pooling across genders) is insignificant. Summarizing these findings:
Result 1: In both lab and field experiments, males give more in the probabilistic treatment(s) than in the certain
treatment(s), as reported in Figure 2 and Table 4. For both experiments, the relevant coefficients are significant in a
linear regression, as shown in Table 5. The difference is also significant in rank sum tests, as shown in Table 4. In
contrast, for females there is no significant difference between these treatments in either the field or the laboratory
experiment.
Result 2: In both lab and field, the amount given responds significantly more positively to the probabilistic
treatments for males than for females, as seen in Table 5.
Table 5: Ordinary Least Squares regressions of donation amount
Field Lab
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.069 1.84** -0.52 1.08 -0.31 1.18*
(0.49) (0.76) (0.44) (0.67) (0.47) (0.69)
Probabilistic 0.42 1.68*** 0.85* 1.56** 0.71 1.41**
(0.51) (0.55) (0.43) (0.68) (0.45) (0.70)
Probabilistic × female -2.21** -1.61* -1.50*
(0.96) (0.84) (0.86)
Constant 1.59*** 0.56** 2.48*** 1.77*** 2.42*** 1.73***
(0.46) (0.28) (0.42) (0.52) (0.42) (0.54)
Observations 348 348 134 134 104 104
Note: Hidden controls: Regressions in columns 3-6 include a laboratory location dummy [Mannheim] and an interacted dummy
[Mannheim×Female].
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Results of t-test indicated at following significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<.05,
*** p<.01.
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We next examine the impact of our treatments on whether participants donated. Table 6 reports the effect of
a donation’s collection being probabilistic on whether an individual committed to make a donation. Again, we
pool the lab treatments Before and Uncertain to create the dummy Probabilistic, and again in columns (5) and (6)
Probabilistic represents the Before treatment only. As noted, in the field experiment, the probability that a male
in the Before treatment committed to donate something is (marginally) significantly larger than the probability
that a male in the After treatment donated. Here, the gender interaction is also significant; females also reacted
significantly less positively to probabilistic treatments at the extensive margin. The results are qualitatively similar
in the laboratory experiments (see columns 4 and 6), but are not statistically significant.
Result 3: Male subjects in the field experiment are significantly more likely to commit to donate in the
probabilistic treatment than they are to donate when their earnings are known, as shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Linear probability model regressions of donation incidence
Field Laboratory
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.051 0.24** 0.091 0.23 0.079 0.22
(1.04) (2.33) (1.14) (1.54) (0.85) (1.45)
Probabilistic 0.0059 0.14* 0.071 0.14 0.074 0.18
(0.10) (1.76) (0.83) (1.09) (0.79) (1.27)
Probabilistic × female -0.23** -0.16 -0.21
(-2.01) (-0.89) (-1.13)
Constant 0.28*** 0.17** 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.63*** 0.57***
(4.72) (2.44) (6.97) (5.13) (6.94) (5.25)
Observations 348 348 134 134 104 104
Hidden controls: Regressions in columns 3-6 include a laboratory location dummy [Mannheim] and an interacted dummy
[Mannheim×Female]. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Results of t-test indicated at following significance levels
* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.
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4.2 Specific Results: Laboratory Experiment
We next present a more detailed analysis focusing on our laboratory data, which offers a richer set of treatments;
average responses are depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Mean donation by treatment, by gender
Table 7 analyzes the impact of each treatment on the amount committed to be donated. Considering the
donations/commitments from 14 Euros, we see strong treatment effects for males, and some gender differences.
Relative to benchmark donations, men committed significantly more in the Before treatment, as well as in the
Uncertain collection treatment; there is no statistically significant difference in males’ giving among the treatments
with uncertain collection. This suggests that the male response was driven by the uncertain collection rather than
the uncertainty of the income, as predicted by our self-signaling model for parameters satisfying case 2. Women
reacted less positively than men to all treatments compared to the baseline, and this difference is significant for
Before and Uncertain treatments. We find no significant differences for donations or commitments from 7 Euros.
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Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions on Donations by Earnings
Earn 14 Earn 7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Male Female Interact Pooled Male Female Interact
Certain
– After -0.34 0.54 -0.90 0.54 0.031 0.56 -0.49 0.56
(0.61) (0.85) (0.74) (0.86) (0.45) (0.73) (0.51) (0.70)
Probabilistic
– Before 0.53 1.74** -0.54 1.74**
(0.52) (0.74) (0.62) (0.74)
– Uncertain 0.94 2.02** -0.33 2.02** 0.16 0.59 -0.23 0.50
(0.72) (0.99) (0.91) (1.00) (0.60) (1.27) (0.73) (1.20)
Interaction Female
– After × Female -1.44 -1.04
(1.13) (0.86)
– Before × Female -2.28**
(0.96)
– Uncertain × Female -2.35* -0.64
(1.35) (1.38)
Female -0.48 1.80** 0.62
(0.44) (0.73) (0.49)
Constant 2.64*** 1.46*** 3.25*** 1.46*** 1.08*** 0.66 1.47*** 0.75**
(0.47) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.33) (0.47) (0.46) (0.34)
Observations 134 70 64 134 61 26 35 61
Hidden controls: Laboratory location dummy [Mannheim] and an interacted dummy [Mannheim ×Female].
Result 4: Relative to the Benchmark, men (but not women) committed significantly more in each of the
treatments (Before, Uncertain) where the donation’s collection was uncertain; their response was similar whether or
not income was uncertain.
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Table 8 analyzes the likelihood of committing or contributing something. Here few treatments are individually
significant, and there are no significant gender differences.
Table 8: Linear Probability Model on Donation Incidence by Earnings
Earn 14 Earn 7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Male Female Interact Pooled Male Female Interact
Certain
– After -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.095 -0.070 -0.10 -0.070
(-0.98) (-0.63) (-0.56) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.33) (-0.46) (-0.34)
Probabilistic
– Before -0.0090 0.089 -0.092 0.089
(-0.08) (0.50) (-0.64) (0.50)
– Uncertain 0.017 0.042 0.0034 0.042 -0.19 -0.33 -0.16 -0.33
(0.13) (0.22) (0.02) (0.22) (-1.10) (-1.09) (-0.70) (-1.11)
Interaction Female
– After × Female 0.021 -0.034
(0.07) (-0.11)
– Before × Female -0.18
(-0.79)
– Uncertain × Female -0.038 0.17
(-0.15) (0.44)
Female 0.090 0.20 0.045
(1.12) (1.01) (0.18)
Constant 0.68*** 0.62*** 0.83*** 0.62*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.62*** 0.58***
(6.15) (3.99) (6.53) (3.99) (4.92) (3.14) (3.57) (3.18)
Observations 134 70 64 134 61 26 35 61
Hidden controls: Laboratory location dummy [Mannheim] and an interacted dummy [Mannheim ×Female].
For robustness to functional form mis-specification we estimated a negative binomial specification, regressingdo-
nation amounts on the same variables as in Table 7. This is one method to address the nonlinear response which
must characterize the true data generating process,as giving can never be negative. For donation incidence we
estimated a Probit regression parallelling Table 8. In each case the results, reported in the online appendix, are
consistent with our linear regressions.
5 Conclusion
Our experiments are the first to document the effect of the resolution of income uncertainty on other-regarding
behavior. For men, donations were higher in treatments where the donation’s collection was uncertain, whether or
not the income was known. This supports a self-signaling explanation: commitments realized with a lower probability
must involve larger amounts to have the same signaling power. While our field experiment participants may have
been making choices in front of peers, in our laboratory experiment a direct external signaling explanation is less
plausible; we took strong steps to ensure that subjects identities could not be tracked to their decisions or treatments.
Thus, the most plausible explanation may be signaling to oneself and a self-image concern. Still, we might not rule
out an indirect external signaling explanation. Firstly, subjects may want to discuss their lab experience with others
afterward. If it is common-knowledge that lying brings a strong internal moral cost, the reported choices may hold a
22
similar signaling power as actual verifiable choices. Secondly, several authors argue that their evidence suggests
that subjects often bring real-world norms into the laboratory, perhaps as a simplifying heuristic (e.g. Hoffman
et al., 1996; Burns, 1985). Thus the male subjects’ lab behavior may reflect their normal image-seeking real-world
motivations as well as, perhaps, their self-signaling.
Our results, found in a particular context for a particular population may not carry over into every situation;
in other environments asking after a bonus may be more effective; perhaps affect/mood may dominate. Allowing
for heterogeneous motivations, the theory presented is ambiguous, suggesting that results may vary according to
the environment. Still, our evidence suggests that contributions involving uncertain realization and/or uncertain
income do not follow the predictions of standard expected utility models. Furthermore, at least some subsets of our
participants donate more when asked to donate from uncertain gains than when asked ex-post.
Although our experiments are of a limited scale, they may be relevant to other forms of prizes, be they from
gambling, from the national lottery, or workplace bonuses. Some sectors, most famously the financial sector, offer
substantial bonuses, the exact magnitude of which are often unclear ahead of time. Our findings suggest that asking
workers in male-dominated industries to commit to give a share of their bonus (or their “bonus in excess of a specified
expectation”) could be an effective revenue generator for charities. In many countries, including the United States,
tax rebates at the end of a fiscal year are both common and uncertain in magnitude, offering another potential
application. When it is unclear whether and how much an individual will win from a gamble (be it a bonus, or a
prize such as the national lottery), the legality of asking – or committing – them to pledge a percentage of that
windfall is ambiguous; governments can help to clarify this. More actively, policymakers could promote the concept
of “windfall giving” whereby people pledge to donate a proportion of their unanticipated gains to a charity of their
choice.
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Appendix
Expected Utility over outcomes
Consider an individual maximizing a Bernoulli utility function v(x, g), where x represents consumption and g the
charitable contribution, subject to non-negativity constraints and to the budget constraint x+ g ≤ Ez; Ez represents
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wealth or purchasing power in state of the world z, where Ez is strictly increasing in its subscript . Under standard
assumptions, this implies unique indirect demand functions, optimal contributions g∗(Ez)∀z , or, more simply g∗0
and g∗1 for z = 0 and z = 1 respectively. In the context of our experiments, we can consider E1=w, the wealth after
winning the prize (or bonus) and E0 = `, the wealth after not winning.
Let us assume her utility satisfies the standard expected-utility properties, so that the utility of a prospect is
the probability-weighted sum of the utility of each element. Suppose she is asked to make a conditional decision,
choosing g0 and g1 before learning the realization of z. Assuming non-satiation, we can substitute in the budget
constraints and express her problem as
g∗0b, g
∗
1b := argmaxg0,g1(1− p)v(y0 − g0, g0) + pv(y1 − g1, g1),
where p is her probability of winning the prize, and v(x, g) is her indirect utility with xavailable for personal
consumption, and where she actually gives g. As explained in the main text, this characterizes the most widely
cited models of giving, including a warm glow model where, as we assume throughout, the warm glow derives only
from the amount actually donated. It is trivial to see that the same choices will maximize this conditional problem,
i.e., g∗0b = g∗0 and g∗1b = g∗1 . (If, as in our field experiment and environment B, we constrain g∗0b = 0, g∗1b = g∗1 will
still hold.) In other words, the timing of the decision (i.e., whether it is a sure thing or a prospect), is irrelevant to
the individual’s choice. A similar argument follows for the Uncertain case. Thus, a standard model will predict
gz = gaz = gbz = guz forz = w or for any level of income.
Online appendix link
Linked at <http://goo.gl/g9lHVG>.
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